Evangelical Clergy Perceptions of Religious Discrimination

I’m attending the Association for the Sociology of Religion meetings in Philadelphia. It’s been a great time connecting with old friends and meeting twitter friends in real life. Yesterday I presented on some data I gathered as part of my book project. Here’s a summary of the presentation.

Last month, Attorney General Jeff Sessions held an event announcing a new task force on religious freedom in front of representatives from the Little Sisters of the Poor, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, and the Alliance for Defending Freedom. As the Religion New Service reported Sessions said that “he is creating a religious liberty task force to challenge what he called a dangerous movement ‘eroding our great tradition of religious freedom.'”

Such a reference to “a dangerous movement” is confusing in light of other indicators. Consider that a week later, Vice President Pence made remarks about the creation of the Space Force and closed those remarks by referring to God’s protections and paraphrased several passages of scripture.

And yet the notion of religious discrimination remains strong. Last year PRRI conducted a poll asking various groups their perceptions of who were victims of discrimination in America. White Evangelicals stood apart from other religious groups in the belief that Christians face more discrimination than Muslims (57% to 44%). But what does that really mean?

As part of my current book project, I conducted a pair of online surveys of evangelical clergy. While not the focus of the book, there were a pair of questions that allowed me to look at the religious discrimination issue more directly.

First, respondents gave their reaction to the item, “Society regularly discriminates against people with Christian beliefs.” Their answers are shown in the following chart.

Soc Disc

My surveys focused on Millennials and Boomers. As the data demonstrates, there are very different views based on generation. One way to see this is to subtract the D/SD percentages from the A/SA. For all respondents, this gives a +16.3 (46.7 to 30.1) but when you separate the generations, different patterns emerge. Boomers have a +47% (64.3 to 17.3) while Millennials have a minus 6.1% (33.4 to 39.5).

Respondents were then asked if they personally had been a victim of discrimination based on their beliefs and, if so, how. Only 29% of them said yes — slightly lower for Millenials and slightly higher for Boomers.  (I think of this as equivalent to people hating congress but liking their representative — Christians face discrimination but I don’t.)

For those who did claim some experience of discrimination, I was able to code their responses around five common themes. There are roughly equivalent to the various ways we think about discrimination in race or ethnicity. First, there is a Loss of Social Capital — feeling excluded, marginalized, or isolated. A second category is Bias — assumptions made about one’s character on the basis of stereotype or the expectation that you should defend others’ behaviors or opinions.  Then we have actual Discrimination — loss of a job, limitations on work conditions, being graded down at school because of Christian beliefs. Fourth is the category I call Church and State — disagreements over the public square, public prayers, use of schools and the like. Finally, there was a catch-all Other category which dealt with international, gender, or ethnicity treatments.

When you break down these categories among those who reported perceived discrimination, you get the following chart.

Disc Type

Over six in 10 of the 29% reported as discrimination feelings of marginalization by friends, family, neighbors or being thought stupid or judgmental because one is a Christian. These are important to be sure, but don’t reflect the “dangerous movement” the Attorney General warned about.

There were about a quarter of the 29% whose experiences as they saw them fit definitions of some type of direct limitation on behavior by other groups. It should be noted that all I have is the respondent’s version of events. If they said they lost their (non clergy) job for reading the Bible on break, I take that as given even though it might not have been the employer’s rationale. Someone who reports being limited in sharing faith at the food pantry because it received government funds may be responding to actual policy or maybe be misperceiving limitations.

So what does this tell us about perceptions of religious discrimination? First, most respondents haven’t experienced prejudice or discrimination directly. Second, some have clearly felt some form of micro-aggression as Christians which would be an interesting opportunity for future research. Third, there is an organized attempt by many in the evangelical subculture to promote stories that heighten fears of religious discrimination which is especially effective in a social media outrage environment.

One final point of analysis — there is a relationship between views of social change and perceptions of religious discrimination. Respondents were asked to rate the changes in US society over the last 50 years on a scale of 0 to 100. I compared the responses using a 95% confidence interval for the four conditions present (generation by discrimination). Millennials who did not report feeling discriminated against stood apart from the other three conditions Nearly all of that segment saw the changes in American society as more positive than negative.

Perhaps the fears about religious discrimination in the broader society might be a transitional moment and not a dangerous movement. If millennials are seeing social changes as positive and figuring out how to live their faith within those changes, maybe evangelicals can work from a position of what John Inazu calls Confident Pluralism and not from fear.

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Parsing Luverne First Baptist

Like many people following religion and politics, my interest was piqued when I saw Stephanie McCrummen’s story in today’s Washington Post: “God, Trump, and the meaning of morality.” McCammen does a carefully reported deep dive into life at First Baptist Church in Luverne, Alabama. It paints a picture of a particular aspect of evangelical church culture yet one that should be approached carefully.

 

Luvene

The people of the church (picture credit Michael S. Williamson/The Washington Post) are admittedly not quite sure what to make of Trump, especially in light of Pastor Crum’s summer series on the Ten Commandments. There are the expected questions about Obama faith, concerns about antagonism to Christian views, and an absolute disavowal of Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Yet in this story we catch a glimpse of why it’s so hard to disentangle religious beliefs from a variety of other factors. Each of them impacts the political equation in particular ways.

The context: Luverne is a town of roughly 2800 according to the most recent census estimates. It is the county seat of Crenshaw County in rural southeast Alabama. This is a deep red part of a deep red state. Crenshaw voted for Trump over Clinton by 72% to 26%. While I hesitate to make correlations look like causation, the racial makeup of the county is 73% white and 28% black. In 2017, Crenshaw voted for Roy Moore over Doug Jones by 63% to 35% (values may have hindered the Crenshaw vote — other red counties went much heavier for Moore). It is handy to argue that religious values ought to temper political values but there’s an awful lot of socialization and plausibility structure building that pushes back against that.

The church: There is an assumption of homogeneity in this congregation (and perhaps most congregations). McCrummen quotes a church leader:

“As Southern Baptists in this small town, we want our leader to believe like we do,” said Terry Drew, who had chaired the search committee, and three years later, Crum was meeting their highest expectations of what a good Southern Baptist pastor should be.

The internal congregational culture guarantees a pastor that will maintain that culture. This is not a call for prophetic preaching. The story ends with the observation that Pastor Crum might have called Trump out while preaching on adultery, but stopped short.

Many of the interviews on political ideology appear to occur within the context of the church service (although not all). I’ve written about Lydia Bean’s The Politics of Evangelical Identity in previous posts; her research demonstrates the power of the internal communication structures and the ways in which those become mutually reinforcing. People who don’t fit become uncomfortable and depart.

The Second Coming:  McCrummen’s interviews show people focused on the life to come more than on this one. Political engagement is interesting, but the real question is to make sure one is headed to Heaven. One person not only knows the dimensions of Heaven and the characteristics of Hell, but imagines the kinds of appliances that will be in her Heavenly mansion when she gets there.

Such a focus is consistent with arguments Donald Dayton made nearly 40 years ago on how millenarianism negatively impacts social engagement. Politics may be occasionally interesting, but it’s not the important thing.

Manichaeism and Spiritual Warfare: Present in the interviews is a strong sense of good and evil. Or maybe just evil. Trump may be flawed, but he wasn’t Clinton. She would destroy our way of life, the second amendment, religious freedom, and the entire nation.

Both political parties and their candidates, then, represent the combatants in the cosmic war between God and Satan. God uses his people to advance his desires while the other side (who are perhaps unwitting instruments) represent all that’s wrong. Recent PRRI data showing that a majority of White Evangelicals see increasing diversity in the society as a net negative demonstrates the perceptions of threatening “others”.

Sheilaism Redux; When Robert Bellah and colleagues wrote Habits of the Heart in 1985, one story that got the attention of sociologists, religionists, and journalists alike was the story of “Sheilaism”. In her interview, Shelia reported:

“I believe in God. I’m not a religious fanatic. I can’t remember the last time I went to church. My faith has carried me a long way. It’s Sheilaism. Just my own little voice…It’s just try to love yourself and be gentle with yourself. You know, I guess, take care of each other. I think He would want us to take care of each other.”

McCrummen finds another Sheila, this one a Sunday School teacher at First Baptist. She is certainly more devout than that other Sheila. But her political theology is no better constructed.

Sunday School Sheila explains:

“Obama was acting at the behest of the Islamic nation,” she began one afternoon when she was getting her nails done with her friend Linda. She was referring to allegations that President Barack Obama is a Muslim, not a Christian — allegations that are false. “He carried a Koran and it was not for literary purposes. If you look at it, the number of Christians is decreasing, the number of Muslims has grown. We allowed them to come in.”

“Obama woke a sleeping nation,” said Linda.

“He woke a sleeping Christian nation,” Sheila corrected.

Linda nodded. It wasn’t just Muslims that posed a threat, she said, but all kinds of immigrants coming into the country.

“Unpapered people,” Sheila said, adding that she had seen them in the county emergency room and they got treated before her. “And then the Americans are not served.”

Love thy neighbor, she said, meant “love thy American neighbor.”

Welcome the stranger, she said, meant the “legal immigrant stranger.”

“The Bible says, ‘If you do this to the least of these, you do it to me,’ ” Sheila said, quoting Jesus. “But the least of these are Americans, not the ones crossing the border.”

This version of Sheilaism has shocked people on my twitter feed today.

But it shouldn’t.

There is no reason to suggest that Jesus was only concerned with one’s neighbor of nationality (it was, in fact, the entire point of the parable of the Good Samaritan!). And to be fair to Sheila, I don’t think she believes that. She is combining her political beliefs with her religious beliefs in ways that sound right to her.

She has an idea that her theology ought to inform her political positions but when they become incompatible she papers over them. She’s not hypocritical, she simply is striving for cognitive consistency. And coming out in favor of immigrants just doesn’t fit her culture and upbringing.

——–

What does this story really tell us about the politics of evangelicals and their congregations? It gives us a glimpse into how conservative white evangelicals process their political views. But those views occur in a particular context of community, history, eschatology, and personal psychology. Trying to sort out precisely which one is operative at any given point of time is nearly impossible.

In closing, I should also note that Guthrie Graves-Fitzsimmons pointed out yesterday that journalists and researchers seem particularly interested in seeing these stories told of evangelical Trump supporters. It’s a worthwhile thought experiment to imagine Stephanie McCrummen doing a deep-dive story on a United Church of Christ congregation in Seattle. It would be a fascinating sociological comparison between the two congregations and how they approach politics.

 

My Review of John Fea’s “Believe Me”

This week I drove to Valparaiso, Indiana to have lunch with religious historians Heath Carter and Dan Silliman and to conduct background interviews for one of the book chapters. It gave me a perfect opportunity to listen to John Fea’s Believe Me: The Evangelical Road to Donald Trump.

Believe MeFea, history professor at Messiah College in Pennsylvania, has been a prolific blogger for many years. His webpage, “The Way of Improvement Leads Home”, is a tremendous source of some of the latest happenings in Christian academic circles. Along with many others I could list, he has exerted great effort in the last two years to make sense of the connections between evangelicals and support for Donald Trump both in the election and beyond. He has coined the term “Court Evangelicals” to refer to those public figures in evangelical circles who go out of their way to defend Trump in the media: Jerry Falwell, Jr., Franklin Graham, Robert Jeffress, and Paula White, just to name a few. He has an interesting chapter unpacking the three strands of Court Evangelicals: the former Christian right, the Independent Charismatic group/dominionists, and the Prosperity Gospel leaders. It’s always important to remember that most evangelical leaders don’t fall in this group.

His engagement with these issues over the past three years gave birth to Believe Me, recently published by Eerdmans. As a historian and an evangelical, Fea is in a great position to explore both the continuities and discontinuities with past evangelical political engagement. Both insider (as an evangelical Christian) and outsider (as an academic and never-Trumper), he manages a compassionate yet critical stance toward the broader question of “the 81%”.

It is clear from the outset that John has been strongly influenced by sociologist James Davison Hunter’s To Change The World (2010). Fea picks up on Hunter’s argument that a conflict approach to cultural engagement evidenced by Culture Wars (the title of a book Hunter wrote 20 years earlier) is damaging to the church. I have recently been making the same argument in my manuscript. John sees the current situation of evangelical alignment as a long-term historical development arising around three broad features: Fear of Change, The Search for Power, and a Nostalgic Grasp for some Golden Age.

Building from the long-view of religious change, the book walks its way from Puritans worrying about diversity in their midst, to the anti-Catholicism of the Know-Nothings, to the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy, to Civil Rights legislation, to Supreme Court decisions banning prayer and Bible reading in schools. One after another, the self-perception of conservative Protestants as “the real Americans” is challenged by new waves of “others” who wind up on our shores. In this manner, one sees that the perceptions of loss that Robert Jones describes in The End of White Christian America have always been part of the American religious story. Religious diversity by definition means that prior assumptions of homogeneity will be violated. In this context, a presidential candidate that promises to “protect Christians” and their religious freedom (even from the IRS!), who can reverse anti-Christian court decisions, and who will privilege support of Israel can be seen as “one of ours” even if he’s not. John makes a very interesting observation: the Christian right politicians like Cruz and Carson played on the nature of evangelical fear but voters wanted a strong-man to see those issues addressed and so switched to Trump.

In terms of Power, Fea tells a story that has been told at length elsewhere. This describes the move of evangelical Christians into the public and media spheres. From Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority to Pat Robertson’s 700 Club and presidential run to the Christian Coalition to the dominionist rhetoric of Christian right presidential candidates in 2016, there has been a struggle for having “our side” win. Such a struggle requires an “othering” of one’s political opponents, seeing them in the worst possible light and believe outrageous things about them (Vince Foster, PizzaGate, Benghazi). Part of the struggle for power requires overlooking the flaws of our side while maximizing those of their side. John documents the great concerns about Bill Clinton during the impeachment process of the late 1990s and contrasts those with defenses of Trump in 2016. This conforms with the PRRI data showing that only 30% of white evangelicals said that character was important in their preferred candidates, a reversal from just a few years before.

The Nostalgia chapter explores a central question: when was America great? When we make America Great “Again”, what’s the referent? John shows that every period the Christian America crowd like Jeffress looks to had significant negative implications for other segments of the society. It seems to me that the real slogan of the campaign was “Make America Great Again for Me and Mine”.

As an evangelical Christian, Fea wants his readers (listeners) to remember that fear, power, and nostalgia are not the way Christians are to operate in this world. We are people of hope. We are people who follow Jesus who, as Philippians reminds us, gave up everything. He didn’t side with those religious leaders who pursued Power — they started trying to kill him early in his ministry. We don’t look only to the past because we have the promise of the Kingdom of God unfurling in our midst.

John ends the book on that hopeful note, reflecting on how the Black church during the civil rights movement operated in ways that were forward looking in the midst of their pain and suffering at the moment. That last section of the book reminds the evangelical church that we aren’t clamoring for some imagined Christian past but are God’s people looking hopefully toward God’s glorious future.

 

Evangelicals and the Challenges of Modernity

HunterAs part of my book project, I’m tracing how sociologists have approached evangelicals from a theoretical rather than descriptive perspective. What follows is my treatment of James Davison Hunter’s American Evangelicalism (1983).

 

At the time that major newsmagazines discovered evangelicals in the late 1970s, sociologists hadn’t really devoted sufficient attention to this segment of the American religious landscape. In part, this was due to the belief popular in the 1960s that secularization was a dominant force within society and that religion would be less important going forward. With that presumption, the vitality of a conservative religious group like evangelicals didn’t fit the established theoretical framework. Perhaps, as Steven Warner observed at the time {Warner, 1979}, this could be explained by the biases present even in sociologists of religion — seeing evangelicals as lower class, as politically conservative, and as a historical throwback resisting the natural order of progress.  It should be noted that much of modern journalism, with the exception of religion reporters, suffers from the same biases four decades later. Warner writes:

Evangelicalism has heretofore not received the sociological attention that its intrinsic importance calls for. It is overlooked, or discounted, stereotyped and patronized (3).

One sociologist who responded to Warner’s call for better theoretical work on evangelicalism was James Davison Hunter. His American Evangelicalism {Hunter, 1983} did a deep dive into evangelicalism (although he included fundamentalists in his data set) and examined it from a sociology of knowledge format. To Hunter, the modern age — that earlier sociologists saw as feeding secularism — provided a critical challenge for evangelicals.

Hunter argued that the modern age individualized religion, presented it as but once choice among many, and removed religion from its connections to the broader institutional mosaic. Where faith was previously imbedded in community life, it became increasingly personal. For example, the Supreme Court has dealt with “sincerely held religious beliefs” as the screen used to evaluate religious freedom claims; a clearly individualized approach. In the face of the structural pluralism of religious life, a sense of equivalence is created between mainline churches, evangelical churches, mosques, temples, and yoga classes. Given the diversity of religious views present, and the constitutional protections arising from the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment, religion in general and conservative religion in particular, is removed from consideration of everyday political life.

The response to these challenges, Hunter suggested, occurred in the realm of “cognitive bargaining” — nurturing a particular mode of thought about things religious that stands in contrast to the forces of modernity. While some religious groups focused on how to incorporate the modern age into their religious self-understandings, not so with evangelicals. They adopted a strategy Hunter called cognitive intransigence, “ignoring the plurality by affirming the veracity of one tradition and the illegitimacy of the others (16-17).”

Key to the cognitive instransigence effort is the maintenance of a distinctive “worldview”. Evangelicals spend considerable effort to articulate a particular means of understanding the world in an effort commonly referred to as “apologetics”. Hunter provided a deep analysis of books written to evangelicals designed to maintain a distinct worldview. Interestingly, he observed that many of those books incorporated elements of modern rationality, reducing evangelical faith to a series of steps (“four spiritual laws”).

One of the distinctive elements of evangelicalism in this period was the development of significant parallel structures. Contemporary Christian music arises alongside popular rock-and-roll. Specifically Christian periodicals appear alongside popular newsmagazines. Religious broadcasting moves from being a fringe movement to a staple of American entertainment. Christian publising allows for a continual stream of appropriately supportive material in front of evangelical readers to be found in distinctly Christian bookstores.

Hunter argued that evangelicals were more removed from the forces of modernity given their social location within the broader structures of society. His data showed that evangelicals were significantly more likely to be Southern, rural, and working class. They were far less likely to be college educated.

The combination of parallel institutions and isolated social location allowed evangelicals to maintain their distincive worldview in the face of increasing forces of pluralism and secularity. Doing so, however, is an uphill battle. Hunter argued:

Cognitive survival in this climate will require the continued effort to build and maintain a sociocultural world in which the Evangelical view of reality is actively supported, even taken for granted. Stable institutions acting as plausibilty structures would be capable of reimposing their objectified meanings on a laity perplexed by the contrary realities of day-to-day life, of reassuring the doubter that things are all right after all (132).

I will return to this analysis in the next chapter, but I can give a preview here. Some Christian bookstores, like Family Christian chain closed {Merritt, 2017}. Of those that remain, it has become harder to maintain a consistent worldview as evangelical authors raise new perspectives; some of these have begun dropping certain authors. The presence of online book sources like Amazon and Barnes and Noble render these efforts at control limited at best. The percentage of Christian young people opting to attend Christian universities has declined, especially among denominational schools. Christian universities have had to broaden their generic appeal to maintain enrollment. As we will see later, the impact of social media on those attempting a pristine Christian worldview cannot be overstated.

The social location of evangelicals has changed since Hunter first wrote, exacerbating the breakdown of the worldview perspective. For example, Hunter found that only 24% of evangelicals had more than a high school education. The 2014 Pew Religious Landscape survey, in contrast, showed that 62% of evangelicals had some post-secondary education and 13% had graduate or professional degrees. Similarly, Hunter had found that 44% of evangelicals lived in rural areas. Research by Ryan Burge in 2016 {Burge, 2016 #681} estimating evangelical location using county level data showed that 47% of evangelicals lived in major metropolitan areas or their suburbs. Finally, Hunter’s data showed that only 38% of evangelicals were middle or upper class (according to his measures). Adjusting his categories by the rate of inflation in the Pew data shows taht fiugre increase to 52% (roughly a quarter of respondents fall in each of Hunter’s four class categories).

If we take the worldview and social location issues together, then, evangelicals have struggled with “the quandary of modernity” precisely as Hunter suggested. As the worldview dynamics weaken while evangelicals are mingling more in contemporary secular society, it creates fissures in what might have been a more coherent perspective in past decades.

This has two predictable outcomes. One is increased innovation within the evangelical camp with less coherent boundaries. The other, paradoxically, is an increased defensiveness of those who hope to protect those boundaries. Christian Smith’s American Evangelicalism {Smith, 1998} is helpful in explaining this latter phenomenon.

The Failure of Deterrence and Asylum Seekers

When I took criminology as an undergraduate over 40 years ago, we read this book by criminologists Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. The short version of their argument is that deterrence seems like it should work from a conventional wisdom standpoint but in fact there is very little evidence that it does. Their finding has been consistently replicated over the intervening years.

They repeated an old story, which I’m paraphrasing (I don’t still have the book):

A man comes upon his friend on the sidewalk of a city street The friend is snapping his fingers every few seconds. The man asks what the friend is doing. “Keeping away tigers”, the friend replies. “That’s stupid”, says the man. “Do you see any tigers?” replies the friend.

The logic of deterrence assumes that people consider potential punishment and than coordinate their behavior accordingly. If we declare War on Drugs, people will stop dealing or using in order to avoid the new harsh sentences. If we declare a “no tolerance” policy on border crossings, even for asylum seekers, they will think twice about coming to the United States. If we tell them that we’ll separate their children from them if they commit the misdemeanor of undocumented crossing, they won’t try it.

Deterring RefugeesThis is precisely the logic the Trump administration is using. As this story from Philip Bump reports, they have been very explicit about it.

White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly told NPR that the point was to keep people from trying to enter the country.

They’re coming here for a reason. And I sympathize with the reason,” he said. “But the laws are the laws. But a big name of the game is deterrence.” He added that separating children from parents “could be a tough deterrent — would be a tough deterrent.”

Data suggest that it hasn’t been.

So why doesn’t deterrence work as expected?

First, deterrence theory (and all rational choice views of criminality) assume that people are hedonistic; weighing potential gains against expected costs. But a great deal of criminality occurs by individuals who aren’t considering the implications of their actions. They get in a fight, they need a drug fix, they have mental illness challenges, they have family histories that encourage them to act out of established and dysfunctional scripts. After the fact, they will see that the cause (action) and effect (punishment) are related but not in the moment. They know their current situation is untenable and will do anything to get out of it.

Second, deterrence theory is often stated as an attempt to control a single action rather than seeing the available choice as one among a set of choices. In this regard, people decide that the risk of the current choice is preferable to the alternatives. Perhaps the drug dealer doesn’t see other opportunities that will provide him with economic sustainability within his community. He knows dealing is wrong and carries the risk of strict punishment but compared to the alternatives, perhaps it’s a good choice. (We’re currently reading Fr. Gregory Boyle’s Barking to the Choir in my Sunday School which connects these themes very well.)

Asylum seekers have been traveling for months to flee the harsh conditions of their homes. They consider the “critical fear” that they faced in their host country as a poor choice for their family. They have already dealt with smugglers and harsh conditions. Having decided not to stay at home or to stop along the way, they want to make their case for asylum to see if they can get residency in the US where their children don’t live under threat.

This is the problem with deterrence. Once you’ve bought into the false logic that punishment is the key to controlling behavior, you just keep ratcheting up the punishment.

If arrest doesn’t stop asylum seekers from trying to enter the US, then separate the children. If separating the children doesn’t act as a deterrent, put people in tent cities in isolated parts of Texas. If putting people in isolated parts of Texas doesn’t work, figure out some more public and humiliating punishment.

Whatever you do, just keep snapping your fingers or we’ll be overrun by tigers.

The Mainlining of Evangelicalism

I’m currently working on the theoretical chapter for my book, tracing how sociologists (and others) have examined evangelicalism over the last four decades. There have been shifts in their theoretical formulations which explain quite a bit of the changing nature of evangelical perspectives.

QuebedeauxIn this review, I went back to an early book by a non-sociologist. Richard Quebedeaux’s The Young Evangelicals was written in 1974. It is surprising in its analysis in that it describes much of what I see among those Permeable Evangelicals who are the focus on my book project. Quebedeaux describes their commitments as follows:

1) An interest in human beings not simply as souls to be saved but as whole persons;

2) More active involvement by evangelical Christians in sociopolitical affairs;

3) An honest look at many churches’ idolatry of nationalism;

4) Adoption of new forms of worship;

5) An end to judging spiritual commitment by such externals as dress, hair style, and other participation in cultural trends, including rock music;

6) A new spirit with regard to ecumenical or nonecumenical attitudes;

7) Bold and, if need be, costly involvement in the revolutionary struggles of our day; and finally,

8) A reappraisal of life values.

 

Quebedeaux’s analysis raises a key question — what happened to these people and how did we get such a different popular understanding of evangelicalism?

I want to suggest that there were some significant changes in evangelicalism that occurred shortly after Quebedeaux’s book came out. In December of 1977, Time magazine declared it to be “The Year of the Evangelical”. Jimmy Carter had been elected president as the first professed “born-again” candidate, even giving his infamous “lust in the heart” interview with Playboy. Time‘s cover story was titled “That Old-Time Religion: The Evangelical Empire”

The Assemblies of God showed tremendous growth just as the Presbyterians and Methodist were facing monumental membership declines. Dean Kelley had just written Why Conservative Churches are Growing and church leaders jumped on the bandwagon arguing that this was true religion (every conference I attended in the 1980s has session debunking Kelley but that didn’t seem to matter).

Two other changes are of import. First, conservative religion became increasingly a private affair. This is why we talk about bakers with “sincerely held religious beliefs”. The individualization of religious belief and behavior grew dramatically.

Second, there are the twin phenomenon of non-denominationalism and megachurches (clearly related). The increased visibility of large church plants, broadcast ministries, and evangelical celebrities brought visibility to evangelicals where mainline churches became invisible and subject to dismissive analysis of places where “people don’t believe anything”.

So evangelicalism went from being marginal (although it likes to think it is) to being mainline. Journalists don’t write stories about the formerly mainline churches (even though the majority of mainline church attenders voted for Trump, they aren’t seen as important).

I have a number of friends who are excellent religious historians. They have written wonderful books defining the pedigree of evangelicals and how they organized over time. These are important books that tell key dynamics of the evangelical story. It’s hard to hold out just some of these but recent books by Frances FitzGerald and Molly Worthen are excellent examples of this scholarship.

And yet I’m coming to think that evangelicalism as a social movement doesn’t necessarily share a heritage with those early evangelicals. It became an entity unto itself in the 1980s with its own definitions and parameters. This is why it’s so hard to use contemporary data to make sense of evangelical positions on policy and politics.

But Quebedeaux’s Young Evangelicals of the 1970s, like my Permeable Evangelicals today, have a hard time figuring out where they fit within these assumptions about mainline evangelicalism. Quebedeaux’s description of their religious dilemma seems absolutely apt over four decades later.

The Young Evangelical, then, dissatisfied with the position espoused by his Orthodox church, and unhappy about the artificial role he must assume therein, is faced with a dilemma not easily resolved. On the one hand, he can always turn to Liberalism. But what does mainstream Ecumenical Liberalism in its present state have to offer him? And, if he remains faithful to the authority of Scripture, the necessity of conversion, and the mandate for evangelism, he will probably be an unwelcome guest in most Liberal churches and a threat to their ideology. On the other hand, he can withdraw from the institutional church altogether. Yet, in so doing, he may lose the fellowship of like-minded believers he so desperately needs for his own spiritual development, and he will most certainly forfeit an important dimension of his commitment to the Church universal. It is not easy to be a Christian alone. The other option of course, is for the Young Evangelical to remain in his own church – and fight!

Not Quite a Masterpiece

I was hoping to work on research for my book today, but the Supreme Court had other ideas.

This morning, the Court released their decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The 7-2 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy (who also authored both Windsor and Obergefell) ruled against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Experts are calling this a limited decision, not because of the vote but because of certain factors unique to the case.

The plaintiff, Jack Phillips, refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, citing his religious beliefs and that making a cake was an expressive act in line with his free speech rights. The couple filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission. The dispute occurred in 2012, when same-sex marriage was not yet recognized by Colorado law and three years before the Obergefell decision would open the door nationally by striking down anti-gay marriage legislation.

The timing of the dispute is one of the limitations of the decision. The Justices were relying on law as it existed at the time. It’s an open question how such a case would be treated post-Obergefell.

KennedyJustice Kennedy focused on a particular aspect of the Masterpiece case: the perception of religious bias on the part of one or two members of the Civil Rights Commission. During one hearing, Phillips was simply told to keep his religious beliefs out of the public square. In another, a commissioner made the following statement quoted in Kennedy’s ruling:

“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” Tr. 11–12.

This is the other major limitation of the Masterpiece case; the presence of apparent bias against religious expression as a legitimate value to be considered. Kennedy concludes his argument with the same kind of hopeful language he provided in Obergefell.

The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.

Today’s decision is hard to use as a guideline because it is essentially a negative argument — it defines how governmental groups must not act. But it provides little guidance on how that might work.

As I’ve written before, the 1990 Smith decision provides that religious expression cannot trump “generally applicable law” as long as the law does not provide an “undue burden” on the citizen or religious group. Curiously, today’s decision draws heavily from another Kennedy decision from 1993: The Church of Lakumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah.

In all my amateur explorations of religious freedom jurisprudence, this one had escaped me entirely. A syncretistic religious group, Santeria, practiced the sacrifice of chickens as part of their religious practice. The City of Haileah, Florida thought this was a bad idea and passed an ordinance criminalizing animal sacrifice (with some exemptions). But key to the case, and key to its use today, is that city council members denounced the religious group in particular calling it unAmerican, abhorrent, and uBiblical. It seems the public prejudice against this group as expressed by the council and citizen comments, suggested that the decision was prejudicial against a legitimate (although deviant) religious expression.

So Justice Kennedy tells us that in our search for accommodation of religious expression and non-discrimination, we have to be searching for resolution without prejudicing one side or the other.

This will likely prove quite difficult in practice. We have already seen strongly worded state legislation protecting certain traditional religious values that do so with prejudice toward LGBTQ individuals. We certainly see comments on social media about religious bigotry that sound a lot like comments made by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Kennedy’s closing paragraph (above) suggests lots more court cases as groups err on either side.

While Justice Ginsberg felt the Commission’s actions should not be limited by comments from one or two members, I tend to side with Justice Kennedy. If others on the Commission had spoken out against those comments, or at least provided a more balanced approach, then one or two outliers wouldn’t be a problem. In the absence of any record to the contrary, it’s reasonable to argue the Commission was less than fair in their review.

This lack prevented the Commission (and thereby SCOTUS) from addressing the freedom of expression part of Phillips’ claims. Does a baker “own” the words put on the cake as a matter of identity?

Justice Gorsuch, concurring with the main ruling, spends quite a bit of time on this  by drawing upon an amicus filing by someone who was refused when asking bakers to bake anti-gay cakes. (It’s a surprisingly poorly argued opinion!) Because bakers who baked anti-gay cakes would be held accountable for what the cake said, so should Phillips, Gorsuch argued.

So Justice Kennedy encourages us to 1) resolve disputes with tolerance, 2) not disrespect sincerely held religious beliefs, and 3) not expose LGBTQ citizens to indignities. The first of these points seems paramount. You cannot find the balance between 2 and 3 without 1. As chair of the City of Jackson Human Relations Commission, I have a natural interest in trying to think through how Kennedy’s balance might be achieved.

Kennedy seems to create an expectation that SCOTUS, at least as long as he remains on the Court, would anticipate some level of compromise between service providers and LGBTQ clients. Perhaps bakers will provide cakes that simply say “congratulations on your wedding” and leave off the names and the figurines. Maybe florists will serve all customers but make clear that they can’t be expected to set up the flowers in the wedding venue. In other words, if there is a way to provide the service without in some way participating in the actual ceremony, that accommodation should be found. (Ministers and photographers/videographers would therefore be in a different category).

Such accommodation would work very differently in terms of pharmacists or doctors denying service or a county clerk signing a marriage certificate. Their actions do not constitute a direct participation in activities they see as opposed to their strongly held religious beliefs.

The Court should be crystal clear that such accommodations do not extend to issues of hiring, termination, pay, or rental status. Even though many states have yet to pass these important civil rights safeguards, these exclusionary actions are in a very different category than bakers and florists.

On balance, then, the Masterpiece decision is important as an illustration of what not to do. It is only another step in what is going to be a long journey. It’s important for all sides in the debate to avoid the temptation to score wins and losses. We have a lot of work still in front of us.